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E m p l o y m e n t  a n d  I n t e l l e c t u a l  D i s a b i l i t y
L e s l ie  P ic k e r in g  F ra n c is*
Under recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, people with 
disabilities alleging employment discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) are caught in a vicious triangle. One vertex of the 
triangle is self-accommodation. Correcting for their impairments through effort, 
prosthetic devices such as eyeglasses, hearing aids, or medications, they are 
evaluated in their ameliorated state and do not qualify as disabled at all.1 At this 
self-accommodation vertex, they are not entitled to the protection of the ADA 
because they are not disabled under current interpretations of the ADA.2 A 
second vertex is the ability to succeed in some jobs, despite impairments. At 
this vertex, people with impairments may be unable to claim the protection of 
the ADA because of their success in working. Their difficulty lies in identifying 
a major life activity substantially limited by their impairment. Although 
“working” is a major life activity, current case law requires people to show their 
inability to perform a range of jobs, not merely the particular job for which they 
are seeking ADA protection, in order to count as “substantially limited” in 
working and thus as disabled.3 By virtue of their success at some jobs, people at 
this second vertex may also find it difficult to demonstrate substantial limits in 
other major life activities, such as learning. At the third vertex are people who 
neither self-accommodate nor succeed even with accommodations. Instead, they 
continue to encounter apparent difficulties in performing the job at issue, at 
least with the accommodations proposed for them. But they are barred from 
claiming the protection of the ADA to seek further accommodations because
* A lfred  C . E m ery  P ro fe s so r  o f  L aw , P ro fe s so r  a n d  C h a ir ,  D e p a r tm e n t o f  P h ilo s o p h y  
U n iv e rs ity  o f  U ta h . I w o u ld  lik e  to  th a n k  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  U ta h  C o lle g e  o f  L a w  fo r  re se a rc h  
su p p o r t,  a n d  M a r th a  E r tm a n , E r ik a  G eo rg e , D a n  G re e n w o o d , L a u ra  K e ss le r , A n ita  S ilv e rs , L ee 
T e ite lb a u m , D e b o ra  T h re e d y , a n d  M a n u e l U tse t fo r  c o m m e n ts  on  e a r l ie r  d ra f ts .
1. S e e ,  e . g . ,  S u tto n  v. U n ite d  A ir lin e s , 5 2 7  U .S . 471  (1 9 9 9 ) .
2. A n  a l te rn a t iv e  s tra te g y  is  to  try  to  b r in g  a  c a se  u n d e r  th e  th ird , “a s  re g a rd e d  a s ”  p ro n g  o f  
th e  d e f in itio n  o f  d is a b i li ty , 4 2  U .S .C . § 1 2 1 0 2 (2 )(C ) (2 0 0 4 ) . U n d e r  th is  p ro n g , th e  p la in t i f f  co n te n d s  
th a t th e  e m p lo y e r  a c te d  a d v e rs e ly  o u t o f  th e  m is ta k e n  b e l ie f  th a t th e  p la in t i f f  w as  d is a b le d . T h is  
p ro n g  is u n lik e ly  to  s u c c e e d , h o w ev e r , i f  c o u r ts  re q u ire  th a t th e  e m p lo y e r  n o t o n ly  re g a rd  th e  
e m p lo y e e  a s  im p a ire d , b u t a lso  reg a rd  h im /h e r  a s  lim ite d  in  a  m a jo r  life  a c tiv i ty  b e c a u se  o f  the  
im p a irm e n t. U n d e r  th is  re a d in g  o f  th e  “ as re g a rd e d  a s ”  p ro n g , th e  e m p lo y e r  m u s t h a v e  b e l ie fs  th a t, 
i f  tru e , w o u ld  b r in g  th e  e m p lo y e e  u n d e r  th e  firs t p ro n g  o f  th e  d e f in itio n  o f  d is a b i li ty . 4 2  U .S .C . § 
1 2 1 0 2 (2 )(A ) (2 0 0 4 ) . S u p p o se  th e  e m p lo y e r  ju s t  sa y s . “ I d id n 't  th in k  E  c o u ld  d o  th is  jo b .  T h a t 
d o e s n ’t m e an  I th o u g h t h e  c o u ld n 't  w o rk , w h ic h  is w h a t I w o u ld  h av e  h ad  to  h a v e  th o u g h t to  h a v e  
re g a rd e d  h im  as u n a b le  to  p e rfo rm  th e  m a jo r  life  a c tiv i ty  o f  w o rk in g ."  T h e se  b e l ie fs , if  tru e , w o u ld  
n o t b r in g  th e  e m p lo y e e  u n d e r  th e  firs t p ro n g , a n d  th u s  th e  e m p lo y e e  w o u ld  n o t q u a l ify  u n d e r  th e  
th ird  p ro n g  e ith e r . S e e ,  e . g . .  D e a s  v. R iv e r  W e st. L .P ., 152 F .3 d  471  (5 th  C ir . 1 9 9 8 ) (d is c u s s in g  an  
e m p lo y e e  w ith  se iz u re  d is o rd e r) .
3. S e e ,  e . g . ,  T o y o ta  M o to r  M fg ., K y ., Inc . v. W illia m s . 5 3 4  U .S . 184 (2 0 0 2 ) .
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they are deemed not “qualified” for the job.4 Self-accommodated, successful, or 
unsuccessful, people with mental or physical impairments find themselves 
unprotected under current anti-discrimination law in the United States.
This triangle poses especially serious difficulties for people with 
intellectual disabilities. As the data cited below indicate, people with even mild 
cognitive impairments cluster at the third vertex, that of people who neither 
self-accommodate nor demonstrate that they are otherwise qualified for the 
employment they seek. Whether the problematic limits in the structure of 
current law can explain their clustering at this vertex is controversial. A 
number of different interpretations might explain why people with cognitive 
disabilities cluster problematically at the third vertex. One interpretation is that 
the ADA is interpreted too narrowly: although the ADA is properly understood 
as a statute that levels the playing field by prohibiting discrimination, recent 
cases have unjustifiably curtailed this understanding. A second interpretation is 
that employment law for people with intellectual disabilities focuses only on the 
prohibition of discrimination. People with intellectual disabilities, under this 
interpretation, cannot succeed competitively. Instead, they require further 
support if they are to become employed or otherwise survive economically. The 
third interpretation is that there is a mismatch between the anti-discrimination 
paradigm of the ADA and how courts and the law understand the current 
structure of employment. For example, some fruitful accommodations for 
people with cognitive disabilities, such as job coaches or employment teams, 
have seemed to some courts to put individual qualifications into apparent 
question. Such courts, by misunderstanding the nature of these 
accommodations, have erroneously concluded that the ADA does not protect 
these accommodations.
This essay begins with an overview of the problem of employment for 
people with life-long intellectual impairments. It then argues for the importance 
of employment for people with cognitive impairments. Although a number of 
commentators have addressed the case for employment of people with 
disabilities generally, less has been said about employment of people with 
intellectual disabilities specifically. The essay then explores anti- 
discriminationism, welfarism, and assumptions about the structure of 
employment as explanations of why current ADA jurisprudence has left people 
with intellectual impairments largely unprotected. The analysis focuses on 
several recently reported decisions in employment discrimination claims 
brought by people with intellectual impairments. These decisions raise typical 
problems concerning employment discrimination for people with intellectual 
disabilities. In these cases, courts make assumptions about the structure of 
employment and what it means to be a qualified employee that disadvantage
4 . T h e  d e f in it io n  o f  " q u a l if ie d  in d iv id u a l”  w ith  a  d is a b i l i ty  is  a t  4 2  U .S .C . § 1 2 1 1 1 (8 )  
(2 0 0 4 ) . S e e ,  e . g . ,  A lb e r ts o n ’s , In c . v. K irk in g b u rg , 5 2 7  U .S . 5 5 5  (1 9 9 9 )  (h o ld in g  th a t a n  in d iv id u a l 
w a s  n o t “q u a l if ie d ”  d e s p i te  se lf -a c c o m m o d a tio n ) .
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people with intellectual disabilities. This essay thus defends the third 
interpretation— that courts have failed to understand the structure of work— as 
an unexplored possibility for many people with intellectual impairments: as 
long as anti-discrimination policy is seen as applying to individual employees 
and employers, people with intellectual disabilities remain at risk of clustering 
at the third vertex, erroneously and dishearteningly viewed as unqualified for 
employment they seek.
I .  W o r k  a n d  I n t e l l e c t u a l  I m p a i r m e n t
People with intellectual disabilities are more likely to face problems in 
finding and keeping employment than are people with physical disabilities. Yet, 
employment is an important good for them. Their capacities to work are too 
frequently under-appreciated and under-utilized.
A. The C urrent Em ploym ent Situation f o r  P eop le  with In tellectual Im pairm ents
Even though the ADA has been law in the United States for nearly fifteen 
years, the employment picture for people with disabilities generally, and for 
people with lifelong intellectual disabilities more specifically, remains 
checkered. “Mental retardation” is defined in terms of limits in intellectual 
ability and adaptive behavior, manifested before adulthood.5 The Association of 
Retarded Citizens (ARC) estimates that between 2.5 and 3% of the population 
(between 6.2 and 7.5 million) are persons with mental retardation.6 The 
majority of these (85%) have estimated IQ scores between 50 and 75, placing 
them in the mild to moderate range.7 A number of genetic diseases are 
associated with mental retardation, some of which, such as PKU, haveO
increasingly been recognized as amenable to medical management.
5. C l i f f o r d  J . D r e w  &  M i c h a e l  L. H a r d m a n ,  M e n t a l  R e t a r d a t i o n :  A  L i f e s p a n  
A p p r o a c h  t o  P e o p l e  w i t h  I n t e l l e c t u a l  D i s a b i l i t i e s  18 -19  (8 th  ed . 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e re  a re  n o to r io u s  
d if f ic u lt ie s  in  m e a s u r in g  b o th  IQ  a n d  s k ills  in  s o c ia l a d a p ta tio n . C u r re n t w o rk  o n  m e n ta l re ta rd a tio n  
re c o g n iz e s  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  it is a  so c ia l c o n c e p t. I d .  a t  19. T h e  id e a  o f  “ s ix -h o u r  r e ta rd a tio n " —  
p e o p le  w h o  fu n c tio n  re a s o n a b ly  w ell in o rd in a ry  life , b u t n o t in  s c h o o l— e m p h a s iz e s  b o th  c u l tu ra l 
fa c to rs  a n d  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  b ro a d e n in g  th e  d e f in it io n  o f  re ta rd a tio n  b e y o n d  p e r fo rm a n c e  on  
s e le c te d  a c a d e m ic  ta sk s . L y n d a  C r a n e ,  M e n t a l  R e t a r d a t i o n :  a  c o m m u n i t y  i n t e g r a t i o n  
a p p r o a c h  7 5  (2 0 0 2 ) .
6 . A ss o c ia tio n  o f  R e ta rd e d  C it iz e n s , a t  h t tp :/ /w w w .th e a rc .o rg /fa q s /m rq a .h tm l ( la s t v is ited  
J u n e  1, 2 0 0 4 )  [h e re in a f te r  A R C ], T h e  e s tim a te  o f  3 %  h a s  r e m a in e d  c o n s is te n t o v e r  th e  p a s t fo rty  
y ea rs . S e e  R o b e r t  B . E d g e r t o n ,  T h e  C l o a k  o f  C o m p e t e n c e  1 (1 9 9 3 ) .
7 . E d g e r t o n ,  s u p r a  n o te  6 , a t 4 .
8. I d .  a t 2.
9 . R ic h a rd  K o ch  e t a l ., L o n g - T e r m  B e n e f i c i a l  E f f e c t s  o f  t h e  P h e n y l a l a n i n e - R e s t r i c t e d  D i e t  i n  
L a t e - D i a g n o s e d  I n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  P h e n y l k e t o n u r i a ,  6 7  M o l e c u l a r  G e n e t i c s  &  M e t a b o l i s m  148 
(1 9 9 9 ) , a v a i l a b l e  a t  h ttp ://p k u n e w s .o rg / ( la s t v is ite d  S e p te m b e r  6 , 2 0 0 4 ) .
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Chromosomal anomalies are also a leading cause of retardation. About 1 to 
1.5/1000 live births are persons with Down syndrome.10 Other chromosomal 
anomalies occur less frequently. Fragile X is a mutation o f the X chromosome 
that occurs in approximately 1/3600 males and 1/4000 to 6000 females. 11 
Nearly all of the affected males have mental retardation (they lack a second X 
chromosome, so are more severely affected), and about a third of the females 
have mental retardation. 12 Autism is also associated with mental retardation; 
estimates of the prevalence of autism are one in two hundred fifty live births, 
with the majority of diagnoses occurring in males.13 Finally, problems with 
pregnancy, birth, and postnatal living situations (such as exposure to lead) are 
leading causes of mental retardation.14
People with disabilities of all kinds are significantly more likely to be 
unemployed than are members of the general population. The best data 
concerning employment of people with disabilities are found in the survey 
conducted every four years by the Harris Poll for the National Organization on 
Disability.15 The 2000 data indicate that, “among adults o f working age (18 to 
64) with disabilities, three out of ten (32%) work full or part-time, compared to 
eight out of ten (81%) o f those without disabilities, a gap of forty-nine 
percentage points.”16 The more severe the disability, the less likely a person is 
to be employed. People with minor disabilities are eight times more likely to be 
employed than are people with very severe disabilities (64% versus 8% 
respectively).17 These figures reveal a growing divergence between the life 
circumstances of people with disabilities who are unable to work in any 
capacity and the employment situation for people with disabilities who are able 
to work. On the one hand, the percentage of people with disabilities who report 
that they are unable to work at all rose steadily from 1986 to 2000, from 29% to 
43%.18 On the other hand, among those with disabilities who are able to work, 
56% are working, up from 46% in 1986.19 However, the unemployment rate for
10. D r e w  &  H a r d m a n ,  s u p r a  n o te  5 , a t  158.
11. N a tio n a l F ra g ile  X  F o u n d a tio n , a t  h t tp :/ /w w w .fra g ile x .o rg /h tm l/s u m m a ry .h tin  ( la s t 
v is ite d  J u n e  1, 2 0 0 4 ) .
12. I d .
13. A u tis m  S o c ie ty  o f  A m e ric a , a t  h ttp :/ /w w w .a u tism -so c ie ty .o rg /s ite /P a g e S e rv e r? 
P a g e n a m e = w h a tis a u t is m  (c i t in g  C D C  d a ta )  ( la s t  v is ite d  J u n e  1, 2 0 0 4 ) .
14. A R C , s u p r a  n o te  6 .
15. N a tio n a l O rg a n iz a tio n  o n  D is a b il i ty , a v a i l a b l e  a t  h ttp ://w w w .n o d .o rg /c o n te n t.c fm ? id = 1 4  
(la s t  v is ite d  J u n e  2 , 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e  2 0 0 4  s u rv e y  w ill b e g in  in  la te  J u n e , 2 0 0 4 .
16. I d .
17. I d .
18. I d .
19. I d .
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people with even mild intellectual impairments remains high, estimated at 
between 70% and 80%.20 Nearly one-third of people qualifying for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) have a primary diagnosis of mental 
retardation.21
Many barriers impede the employment of people with congenital 
intellectual impairments. These include negative attitudes among employers, 
separation between special education and vocational programs, lack of 
supportive services, and a tendency to segregate people with cognitive 
disabilities into sheltered work arrangements.2 The structure of Social 
Security disability generates other disincentives, under which people with
disabilities who go to work may lose income support and eligibility for
23Medicaid.
Yet another set of difficulties, less well understood, may rest in the life 
cycles of people with different types of life-long intellectual impairments.24 
There are wide varieties in the conditions and trajectories of adults with 
intellectual disabilities. For example, generalizations encompassing people with 
Down syndrome and people with fragile X syndrome are inappropriate. 5 Little 
research has been directed towards the aging process of adults with mental 
retardation 26 There is some evidence that people with Down syndrome may 
show the biological characteristics and symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease at 
earlier ages than is typical of the general population.27 If so, this would suggest 
the need for further analysis of the time at which people with Down syndrome 
should be considered “elderly,”28 and additional attention to whether standard 
patterns, such as retirement ages, should be applied to people with Down 
syndrome. Given such limited knowledge of the varied life cycles of people 
with intellectual impairments, the general use of the imagery of childhood in 
descriptions of them is particularly problematic.29 Language such as
2 0 . Jo h n  K reg e l, P r o m o t i n g  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  I n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h  M i l d  C o g n i t i v e  
L i m i t a t i o n s :  A  T i m e  f o r  R e f o r m ,  i n  T h e  F o r g o t t e n  G e n e r a t i o n :  T h e  S t a t u s  a n d  C h a l l e n g e s  
o f  A d u l t s  w i t h  M i l d  C o g n i t i v e  L i m i t a t i o n s  8 7  (A le x a n d e r  J . T y m c h u k  e t a l. e d s ., 2 0 0 1 ) .
2 1 . M a rk  C . W e b e r , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e :  A  P o s t - l n t e g r a t i o n i s t  E x a m i n a t i o n ,  
2 0 0 0  U . 111. L. R e v .  8 8 9 , 8 9 6  n .4 3  (2 0 0 0 ) .
2 2 . K reg e l, s u p r a  n o te  2 0 , a t  87 .
23 . I d .  a t 9 3 .
2 4 . D r e w  &  H a r d m a n ,  s u p r a  n o te  5 , a t 3 1 6 .
25 . L y n d a  C r a n e , M e n t a l  R e t a r d a t io n : a  c o m m u n it y  in t e g r a t io n  a p p r o a c h  85  
(2002).
2 6 . D r e w  &  H a r d m a n ,  s u p r a  n o te  5 , a t 3 1 9 .
27 . I d .  a t 3 2 3 .
28 . I d .  a t  3 1 9 .
29 . I d .  a t  2 82 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
304 The Jo u rn a l o f  G ender, R ace  & Justice [8:2004]
“developmentally delayed” or “mentally retarded” suggests people who are 
changing along common trajectories, albeit more slowly. Classifications in 
terms of mental age (“a mental age of six”) suggest perpetual childhood. Such 
imagery may support the idea that people with intellectual disabilities are not 
yet adults and so do not need employment—or need employment only in 
separate or sheltered settings. Adults with cognitive disabilities, however, are 
not just larger children, suspended Peter-Pan-like in states of arrested 
development. They are adults, with all the variety of interests and capacities this 
suggests.
B. The Im portance o f  Work
In a by-now classic paper, “Disability and the Right to Work,”30 Gregory 
Kavka argued for the right of people with disabilities to employment. Kavka 
called on rights discourse to signal that strong moral arguments favor the social 
goal of employment for people with disabilities.31 He also used rights discourse 
to emphasize that employment grounds urgent and important claims for 
individuals with disabilities against other individuals and groups, and that the 
claims advanced are realizable.32 Kavka recognized the importance of work for 
minimal economic survival.33 Indeed, the current federal benefit level for SSI, 
the program for people who are disabled, do not qualify for Social Security, and 
meet income and asset qualifications, is $564/month for an individual, hardly a 
livable stipend even if it is supplemented by state stipends and Medicaid 
eligibility. 4 But Kavka defends a far more robust right to work than the right to 
a minimum income stream: the right to work as an active member in productive 
processes, to the extent feasible.3
Self-respect is the basis o f Kavka’s claim to employment as a right.36 Self­
respect is a good of great importance that any rational person would be 
presumed to want.37 In contemporary society, Kavka observes, individuals’
3 0 . G re g o ry  S . K a v k a , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  R i g h t  t o  W o r k ,  9  S o c .  P h i l .  &  P o l ’y  2 6 2  (1 9 9 2 ) , 
r e p r i n t e d  i n  A m e r i c a n s  w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s :  E x p l o r i n g  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  L a w  f o r  
I n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  i N s n n r n o N S  1 7 4 -92  (L e s lie  P . F ra n c is  &  A n ita  S ilv e rs  e d s .,  2 0 0 0 ).
31 . I d .  a t  176 .
32 . I d .
33 . I d .  a t  175 (“ M o s t im p o rta n t ly , th e  r ig h t to  w o rk  is a  r ig h t to  e m p l o y m e n t - ,  it  is  a  r ig h t to  
e a r n  in c o m e , n o t s im p ly  a  r ig h t to  rece iv e  a  c e r ta in  in c o m e  s tre a m  o r  th e  re so u rc e s  n e c e ss a ry  to  
a t ta in  a  c e r ta in  le v e l o f  w e lfa re .” ).
3 4 . S o c ia l S e c u r i ty  O n lin e , a t  w w w .s sa .g o v /p u b s /1 0 0 5 5 .h tm l ( la s t  v is ite d  Ju n e  2 , 2 0 0 4 ) .
3 5 . K a v k a , s u p r a  n o te  3 0 , a t  175.
36 . I d .  a t  179 .
37 . I d .
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senses of self-worth are tied critically to work and career.38 Work generates 
reciprocal interaction between respect from others and respect for self.^  
Through work, people receive affirmation of their own worth from others. 
They also receive satisfaction from their own accomplishments. Concerns might 
be raised about how Kavka uses work in developing this account. His 
description of how self-respect is gleaned from respect from others is couched 
in terms of professional work.41 Critics might question whether this dynamic of 
respect works as well for the types of employment accessible to people with 
intellectual disabilities. Scholars of intellectual disability, however, report that 
people with intellectual disabilities receive important self-affirmation from 
meaningful work even if the jobs are not in the professions.42 Through work, 
people do things for others and gain appreciation for what they do. Critics might 
also question whether Kavka is right to tie self-respect to individual work 
achievement in a manner that places individual talents at the forefront. Work, 
however, as I discuss below, need not be conceived in individualized terms; 
people can both give and gain mutual respect through cooperative participation 
in productive activity.
Employment brings benefits in addition to a sense of meaningful 
contribution. Employment brings structure to daily life and connection to the 
community. Employment can be a source of friendship and a variety of 
experiences. People with mental retardation may have difficulty with the social 
skills necessary to acquire and maintain friendships; isolation exacerbates these 
disabilities.44 Work increases self-esteem, gives opportunities for social 
contacts, provides a place within the community, and offers wages that can be 
the basis for autonomy and independence.45 There is also some evidence that 
the experience of working for wages increases scores on measures of 
competence, independence, and social responsibility.
At the level of philosophical theorizing about justice, additional
38. I d .
39 . I d .
40 . I d .
4 1 . K av k a , s u p r a  n o te  3 0 , a t 179 .
4 2 . S e e  P a tr ic ia  R o g a n  e t a l., C a r e e r  D e v e l o p m e n t :  H e l p i n g  Y o u t h  w i t h  M i l d  C o g n i t i v e  
L i m i t a t i o n s  A c h i e v e  S u c c e s s f u l  C a r e e r s , i n  THE FORGOTTEN GENERATION: T h e  STATUS AND 
C h a l l e n g e s  o f  A d u l t s  w i t h  M i l d  C o g n i t i v e  L i m i t a t i o n s  1 1 9 -3 7  (A le x a n d e r  J . T y m c h u k  e t 
a l. e d s .,  2 0 0 1 ).
4 3 . R ic h a r d  S e n n e t t , R e s p e c t  in  a  w o r l d  o f  in e q u a l it y  2 6 3  (2 0 0 3 ) .
4 4 . C r a n e ,  s u p r a  n o te  2 5 , a t 3 86 .
4 5 . I d .  a t 3 6 6 .
46 . I d .  (c i t in g  R . G e rs te n  e t a l.. S p i l l o v e r  e f f e c t s :  I m p a c t  o f  v o c a t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  o n  t h e  l i v e s  
o f  s e v e r e l y  m e n t a l l y  r e t a r d e d  c l i e n t s ,  9 0 (5 )  A m . J . M ENTAL DEFICIENCY 501 ( 19 8 6 )) .
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considerations support recognition of the capacities for employment of people 
with intellectual disabilities. John Rawls, perhaps the most influential twentieth 
century theorist of justice, saw the problem of distributive justice as how the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation are to be shared.47 In Rawls’ view, 
the subjects of justice are limited to those who are full cooperators in social 
life. Under this approach to justice, people who are not able to cooperate in 
shared social life may be owed charity, but they are not owed duties of justice 
as primary subjects of justice. As a result, their claims are at risk of being 
regarded as secondary and derivative, to be satisfied after the demands of justice 
on behalf of full cooperators have been met.49
In his work on justice, Rawls set a controversial threshold for people to be 
considered full cooperators and thus primary subjects of justice. His threshold 
was set in terms of what Rawls believed to be critical to being a moral person. 
Rawls thought that full cooperators must be capable of participating in the 
collective life of society through exercising what he identified as two critical 
moral powers, the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to develop a 
conception of the good. ® Depending on what the exercise of these moral 
powers is understood to involve, people with intellectual disabilities may or 
may not fit the full Rawlsian description. Disability scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to the construction of accounts of the good by, with, and 
for people with cognitive disabilities.51 Understanding people with cognitive 
impairments as having a principled understanding of justice on their own may 
be more difficult, to the extent that cognitive impairments are linked to 
difficulties o f abstract reasoning. Having a sense of fairness, however, may be a 
far more accessible matter. Other scholars of disability have argued that it is a 
mistake to view moral personhood in terms of an individualistic vision of
4 7 . J o h n  R a w l s , J u s t ic e  a s  F a ir n e s s : A  R e s t a t e m e n t  7  (E r in  K elly  e d .,  2 0 0 1 ).
4 8 . I d .  a t 18.
4 9 . T h is  is a  c o m p lic a te d  q u e s tio n , w o rth y  o f  e x te n s iv e  p h ilo s o p h ic a l e x p lo ra tio n . F o r  a  
c r i t ic is m  o f  w h e th e r  R a w ls  p a r t ic u la r ly , a n d  th e  s o c ia l  c o n t ra c t tr a d itio n  m o re  g e n e ra lly , is  fa ir  to  
p e o p le  w ith  d is a b i li t ie s , s e e  M a r th a  N u ss b a u m , B e y o n d  th e  S o c ia l C o n tra c t:  T o w a rd s  G lo b a l 
J u s t ic e , L e c tu re  2 , T a n n e r  L e c tu re s  (N o v . 1 2 -1 4 , 2 0 0 2 ) , a v a i l a b l e  a t  h ttp :/ /p h ilr s s s .a n u . 
e d u .a u /ta n n e r /p a p e rs /  ( la s t  v is i te d  J u n e  4 , 2 0 0 4 ).
5 0 . R a w l s ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 7 , a t  18.
5 1 . T h e se  is s u e s  a re  c o m p le x . A g n ie s z k a  J a w o rsk a  h a s  e x p lo re d  h o w  p e o p le  w h o  h av e  
b e c o m e  c o g n itiv e ly  c o m p ro m is e d  c a n  b e  s a id  to  v a lu e  a n d  th u s  e x e rc is e  a u to n o m y . A g n ie sz k a  
Ja w o rsk a , R e s p e c t i n g  t h e  M a r g i n s  o f  A g e n c y :  A l z h e i m e r ’s  P a t i e n t s  a n d  t h e  C a p a c i t y  t o  V a l u e ,  28  
PHIL. &  P u b .  A f f .  105 (1 9 9 9 ) . In  a n o th e r  p a p e r , I a m  e x p lo r in g  h o w  p e o p le  w ith  c o n g e n ita l 
c o g n itiv e  im p a irm e n ts  c a n  b e  s a id  to  h a v e  a  c o n c e p tio n  o f  th e  g o o d  a n d  m a k e  c r i t ic a l  d e c is io n s  
g o v e rn in g  th e ir  lives . T h e  c a p a c i ty  fo r  a  s e n se  o f  ju s t i c e — i f  i t  in v o lv e s  th e  a b i li ty  to  a c t w ith  fu ll 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  ju s t i c e  a s  R a w ls , a t  le a s t, su g g e s ts  it  d o e s — m a y  b e  m o re  d if f ic u lt  
to  a t tr ib u te , a t  le a s t to  a d u lts  w ith  m o re  th a n  m ild  m e n ta l re ta rd a tio n . T h e se  is s u e s  I la rg e ly  se t a s id e  
in  th is  p a p e r. H o w e v e r , I  d o  ta k e  u p  th e  o th e r  s e t o f  is su e s , th e  p ro b le m  o f  e c o n o m ic  c o n tr ib u tio n , in  
la te r  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  p a p e r.
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separateness and self-determination, as Rawls appears to do. Still others have 
questioned whether the capacity for moral agency as Rawls understands it 
should be the basis for inclusion as a primary subject of justice.53 Dignity has 
been suggested as an alternative.54
Another way to interpret what is required for full cooperation is in terms of 
participation in the economic life of society. Based on this interpretation, one 
would be a full cooperator, and hence a primary subject of justice, if one 
participated to the requisite extent in the process of producing the benefits of 
social cooperation. The idea behind this interpretation is that being a primary 
subject of justice rests on being an economically productive member of society. 
Here, the issue concerning people with cognitive disabilities would be the type 
and level of productive contribution required. If problematic assumptions are 
avoided, this requirement can be met for many with intellectual disabilities. For 
example, it would be a very strong claim to hold that a necessary condition for 
being a productive member of a cooperative scheme is being an individual who 
is able to work independently or alone. Indeed, it might well be the opposite if 
what is at issue is participation in a cooperative scheme. In the cases discussed 
below, the need for supported or teamed employment when people have 
intellectual disabilities is a recurrent theme. Yet, these are not unusual features 
of employment; employment of many kinds involves teamwork, support, and 
interdependence. To gamer the interactive respect available from employment 
does not require that one work entirely independently or unsupported. It 
requires that one contribute interactively. To take a second example, it would 
also be a problematically strong claim to require that people contribute equally 
to the social product in order to be considered full cooperators. People simply 
do not contribute equal economic value— or equally in any other way. To be 
sure, theorists of justice might try to defend some minimal threshold of 
productive contribution, but surely this is a threshold many persons with 
intellectual disabilities can meet, provided they are given the opportunity. As 
long ago as the early 1960s, Robert Edgerton’s path-breaking study 
demonstrated the woeful underestimation o f the capacities for work of people 
with intellectual disabilities.55
This discussion is not meant to defend a view o f justice as primarily a 
matter of distribution among full cooperators. To the extent that the Rawlsian 
view is accepted, however, it provides further reason to emphasize the 
importance of work for people with intellectual disabilities. For it may be
52 . S e e ,  e . g . ,  P e t e r  B y r n e ,  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n d  E t h i c a l  P r o b l e m s  in  M e n t a l  
H a n d i c a p  13 (2 0 0 0 ) .
53 . E . g . ,  H a n s  S . R e i n d e r s ,  T h e  F u t u r e  o f  t h e  D i s a b l e d  in  L i b e r a l  S o c i e t y :  A n  
E t h i c a l  A n a l y s i s  105 (2 0 0 0 ) .
54 . E . g . ,  S a n d r a  F r e d m a n ,  D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  L a w  17 (2 0 0 2 ) .
3 3 . E d g e r t o n ,  s u p r a  n o te  6.
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through work that they achieve the status of subjects of justice. In any event, if 
they are regarded, erroneously, as unable to participate cooperatively, through 
work or other social interactions, they may lose a critical basis of moral respect.
II. Interpreting the ADA Paradigm with Respect to Persons with 
Intellectual Disabilities
As several recent cases illustrate, people with cognitive disabilities have 
not found much success in pursuing claims of employment discrimination under 
the ADA. Despite initial enthusiasm, the ADA has not fully met expectations 
for people with intellectual disabilities.56 There are at least three interpretations 
of why this might be so. One is that the courts’ current understanding of the 
ADA is unjustifiably narrow, in ways that apply particularly to people with 
intellectual impairments. A second is that because people with intellectual 
impairments require special supports, civil rights guarantees, no matter how 
interpreted, will not provide the supports they need. The third, emphasized here, 
is that there is a misfit between the civil rights paradigm and assumptions made 
by courts and the law about the structure of employment. These assumptions are 
both unjustified and function to disadvantage people with cognitive 
impairments.
A. Leveling the P laying F ield: The AD A  as a  C iv il R ights Statute
The goals of the ADA were to eliminate arbitrary restrictions on the ability 
o f people with disabilities to be in the world, to achieve equal opportunity for 
people with disabilities, and to eliminate unnecessary dependency for people 
with disabilities.57 In interpreting Title I o f the ADA, the employment 
discrimination title, many commentators have argued that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act58 should serve as a model.59 In this model, equal employment 
opportunity for people with disabilities principally requires removal of barriers 
from environments constructed in such a way that physical or mental 
impairments manifest themselves as disabilities. “Reasonable
56 . P e te r  B la n c k  &  H ele n  A . S c h a r tz , S t u d y i n g  t h e  E m e r g i n g  W o r k f o r c e , i n  T h e  H u m a n  
R i g h t s  o f  P e r s o n s  w i t h  I n t e l l e c t u a l  D i s a b i l i t i e s :  D i f f e r e n t  b u t  E q u a l  3 5 6  (S ta n le y  S. 
H e rr  e l  a l. e d s .,  2 0 0 3 ) .
57 . 4 2  U .S .C . § 1 2 1 0 1 (a ) (2 0 0 4 ) . S e e  A m e r i c a n s  w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s :  E x p l o r i n g  
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  L a w  f o r  I n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a t  x x  (L .P . F ra n c is  &  A . S ilv e rs  
e d s ., 2 0 0 0 )  [h e re in a f te r  AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES].
58 . 4 2  U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 (e )  (2 0 0 4 ) .
59 . S e e ,  e . g . ,  A n ita  S ilv e rs , T h e  U n p r o t e c t e d :  C o n s t r u c t i n g  D i s a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  C o n t e x t  o f  
A n t i d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  L a w ,  i n  A m e r i c a n s  WITH D i s a b i l i t i e s ,  s u p r a  n o te  5 7 , a t  126.
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accommodations”60 serve to remove barriers; they do not provide “special” 
privileges.
But for persons with cognitive disabilities, when the ADA is understood as 
a civil rights statute, it may prove insufficient to generate employment 
opportunities on a competitive basis. The analytic question is whether this 
insufficiency is the result of an unjustifiably narrow reading of civil rights, or 
the result of the need people with cognitive disabilities have for more protection 
than civil rights can provide them. Consider, for example, the situation of 
Joseph Phillips.61 Phillips was a man with mild mental retardation, who began 
working for DAP (a manufacturer of building products) in 1977 62 He held the 
lowest position at the factory, termed “Entry Level/Utility,” and his work 
consisted of stacking buckets on pallets and helping to clean the warehouse 
floor.63 He was unable to perform any other tasks at DAP, but he had performed 
his assigned tasks for over fifteen years and his employer did not allege any 
problems with his performance 64 By 1995, DAP was experiencing both a 
downturn in business and increased production efficiency.65 As a result, DAP 
decided to reduce the payroll from twelve to eleven employees 66 Because DAP 
could not reassign Phillips to other positions, the employer eliminated 
Phillips 67 Phillips claimed that DAP dismissed him because of his disability, in 
violation of the ADA 68 The court granted summary judgment for the employer, 
concluding that Phillips had not advanced sufficient evidence to show that his 
dismissal was based on his disability 69 The dismissal was based on his skill 
level.70 To be sure, his skill level was the result of his disability, but that did not 
mean that he had been dismissed on the basis of his disability, or so both the
6 0 . 4 2  U .S .C . § 1 2 1 1 1 (9 )  (2 0 0 4 ) .
6 1 . P h ill ip s  v. D A P . In c ., 10 F. S u p p . 2 d  1334 (N .D . G a . 1998). S e e  a l s o  A m . F e d 'n  o f  
G o v 't  E m p lo y e e s  C o u n c il  3 3 , L o c a l 51 v. B e n tse n , 1994  U .S . A p p . L E X IS  2 5 2 6 0  (9 th  C ir . 1994) at 
*8 (h o ld in g  th a t m in t is n o t re q u ire d  to  c re a te  n ew  p o s itio n  fo r e m p lo y e e ) . T h e  a p p e n d ix  to  th e  
fed e ra l re g u la tio n s  g o v e rn in g  T itle  I o f  th e  A D A  lik e w ise  s p e c if ie s  th a t jo b  re s tru c tu r in g  is  n o t 
re q u ire d , 2 9  C .F .R . § 1 6 3 0 .9 , a p p . (2 0 0 4 ).
62 . P h i l l i p s ,  10 F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 1335 .
63 . I d .
64. I d .
65. I d .
66. h i .
67. I d .
68. P h i l l i p s .  10 F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 1335 .
69 . I d .  a t 1336 .
70. I d .
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employer and the court reasoned.71
The P h illips  decision is an example of the limits of current ADA 
jurisprudence. Phillips was a long-term employee, satisfactorily performing a 
job that suited his skills, who became a casualty of changes in the workplace 
and business environment. DAP was not required to create or maintain a job for 
Phillips. Thus, Phillips was an employee who was not protected by the ADA, as 
the court read the ADA. Nor is the P h illip s  court’s reading of the ADA 
idiosyncratic. The Appendix to the federal regulations governing Title I of the 
ADA specifies that the ADA guarantee is to put people with disabilities on an 
equal footing in seeking competitive employment. It reads:
While the ADA focuses on eradicating barriers, the ADA does not 
relieve a disabled employee or applicant from the obligation to 
perform the essential functions of the job. To the contrary, the ADA is 
intended to enable disabled persons to compete in the workplace 
based on the same performance standards and requirements that 
employers expect of persons who are not disabled.72
That is, the ADA aims to provide equal competitive opportunities for people 
with disabilities— not to provide the supports, job restructuring, or economic 
assistance that would allow people with disabilities who are not fully 
competitive, even when the guarantees of the ADA are met, to enter the work 
force.
One response to the P h illips  decision is that the court read the ADA too 
narrowly. The P h illips  court granted summary judgment to Phillips’ 
employer.73 Phillips was thus precluded from a trial that would have examined 
questions such as whether there were training opportunities or job 
restructurings, including the possibilities of teamwork discussed below, which 
would have been reasonable accommodations for his continued employment. 
Current judicial interpretations of Title I of the ADA are notoriously limited; 
here, the limitation was taking the employer’s description of the job at face 
value. An alternative interpretation of P h illips  is that it demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the ADA when viewed as a civil rights statute. Under this 
interpretation, cases such as P h illip s  demonstrate the inability of the civil rights 
paradigm to improve the employment situation for people with cognitive 
disabilities. An alternative is to explore supported employment, income 
supports, or other methods of social support to ameliorate the economic 
circumstances of the long-term cognitively disabled.
71 . I d .
7 2 . 4 2  C .F .R . § 1630 , a p p . a t  B a c k g ro u n d  (2 0 0 4 ) .
7 3 . P h i l l i p s ,  10 F . S u p p . 2 d  a t 1337.
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fl. From  C ivil R ights to  W elfare: E conom ic O pportun ities f o r  P eop le  with 
C ognitive D isabilities
In several important articles, Mark Weber has argued that we need a new 
paradigm for employment of persons with disabilities. Weber agrees that the 
ADA paradigm of leveling the playing field is inadequate to provide genuine 
employment opportunity for many people with disabilities.75 In response to this 
inadequacy, Weber defends what he calls a “post-integrationist” position that 
incorporates affirmative action as in the civil rights model, socially shared 
supports for employment, and reformed welfare benefits.76 While I agree with 
many of Weber’s conclusions, I argue here that he gives inadequate attention to 
the mismatch between employment as a civil right for people with intellectual 
impairments, misleading beliefs about the nature of employment, and 
coordination problems in the current employment market. He thus moves too 
quickly away from civil rights and fails to recognize further possibilities for 
understanding employment for people with cognitive disabilities in civil rights 
terms.
The first step in Weber’s argument is an enhanced understanding of the 
possibilities of affirmative action.77 Weber contends that section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, the section governing federal employment, rests on a 
paradigm of affirmative action that is stronger than the non-discrimination
78paradigm of section 504 and Title I o f the ADA. This paradigm demands that 
the federal government, as an employer, bring people with disabilities into the 
workplace in numbers which would be representative, absent discrimination, 
although it does not require imposing severe economic harm on the employer.79 
Weber then argues that the affirmative action paradigm for people with 
disabilities should “explicitly embrace numerical employment goals.” Weber 
further contends that this paradigm should be enforceable by a private right of
74 . M ark  C . W e b e r , B e y o n d  t h e  A m e r i c a n s  w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s  A c t :  A  N a t i o n a l  E m p l o y m e n t  
P o l i c y  f o r  P e o p l e  w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s ,  4 6  BUFF. L . R e v . 123 , 156 (1 9 9 8 )  [h e re in a f te r  W e b e r , B e v o n d  
t h e  A D A ] ,
75. I d .  a t 137 -3 8 .
76 . M ark  C . W e b e r , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e :  A  P o s t - l n t e g r a t i o n i s t  E x a m i n a t i o n ,  
2 0 0 0  U. ILL. L . R e v . 8 8 9 , 8 93  (2 0 0 0 )  [h e re in a f te r  W e b e r , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e ] .
77 . W e b e r , B e y o n d  t h e  A D A ,  s u p r a  n o te  74 , a t  142.
78 . W e b er, D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e ,  s u p r a  n o te  7 6 ; W e b e r . B e y o n d  t h e  A D A ,  
s u p r a  n o te  74 , a t 156.
79 . W e b e r , B e y o n d  t h e  A D A ,  s u p r a  n o te  74 , a t  149 -50 .
80. I d .  a t 160.
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Q 1
action and should be extended to state and local governments and employers
82in the private sector. He sees affirmative action in this sense as a corrective 
measure for ongoing, unconscious discrimination, and argues additionally forOl
non-remedial set-asides in both public and private employment. Weber 
believes that this employment policy is fair, economically competitive, and 
unlikely to lead to feather-bedding or “make-work.”84
In a subsequent article, Weber moves beyond affirmative action to what heQC
calls a “post-integrationist” position. Historically, “custodialism” was the 
dominant model for disability policy in the United States; it represented the idea 
that people with disabilities needed protection and support through welfare.86 
Custodialism marginalized and patemalized people with disabilities. 
“Integrationism” was the effort to use civil rights to bring people with
87disabilities into the social mainstream. Integrationism, exemplified by the
ADA, failed on a number of counts, according to Weber, not the least of which
88is that it left many with disabilities in problematic economic circumstances. 
“Post-integrationism” brings many factors together to remedy the inadequaciesQQ
of integrationism. As with post-modernism, not all of these factors may fit 
together well.90 Development of anti-discrimination law, including affirmative 
action, remains important but must be supplemented by developments in 
welfare law 91 The stinginess of SSI must be reassessed, as must the distinction 
between SSI as a program for those who are unable to work and work-related 
programs such as Social Security Disability Insurance, private disability
92insurance, and workers’ compensation. Rehabilitation services must be 
increased and eligibility criteria for them broadened.93 Finally, welfare itself
81. I d .  a t  161.
82 . I d .  a t  1 6 2 -6 4 .
83 . I d .  a t  166.
84 . I d .  a t  171 -7 2 .
8 5 . W e b e r , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e ,  s u p r a  n o te  7 6 , a t  8 92 .
86 . I d .  a t  8 99 .
87 . I d .  a t  9 0 3 .
88 . I d .  a t  9 0 8 .
89 . I d .  a t  9 1 2 .
90 . I d .  a t  9 4 1 . W e b e r  w rite s , a lm o s t g le e fu lly , “ A lm o s t l ik e  p o s t-m o d e rn is t  a rt , li te ra tu re , o r  
a rc h i te c tu re , p o s t- in te g ra t io n is t  p ro g ra m s  n ee d  to  d ra w  id e a s  fro m  e v e ry  e ra  to  p ro d u c e  s tru c tu re s  
r e s p o n s iv e  to  c o n te m p o ra ry  n e e d s .”
9 1 . W e b er , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e ,  s u p r a  n o te  7 6 , a t  9 2 2 -2 3 .
9 2 . I d .  a t  9 3 2 -3 3 .
9 3 . I d .  a t  9 3 3 -3 4 . A n il lu s tra t io n  o f  th is  s tra te g y  is  th e  1998  a m e n d m e n ts  to  th e  
R e h a b ili ta t io n  A c t, e n a c te d  a s  T itle  IV  o f  th e  W o rk fo rc e  In v e s tm e n t A c t o f  199 8 , P u b . L . N o . 105-
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must be re-examined to take into account the extent to which current welfare-to-
work programs may impose “[unrealistic expectations for work" on people
with less than total disability.94 The current move away from welfare, Weber
contends, fails to adequately account for the diversity among people with
disabilities and the extent to which some will be unable to compete in the
• 95productive marketplace and will ineluctably require income supplementation. 
While in the end Weber is surely right about the need for income 
supplementation and the justice of sharing the costs socially, he moves away 
from the civil rights paradigm too quickly. In so doing, he underestimates the 
productive potential of people with intellectual disabilities. Such 
underestimation appears in the few reported cases in which people with 
cognitive disabilities have pressed employment discrimination claims.
C. Illustrative C ases
Very few litigated cases involve employment discrimination claims 
brought by people with cognitive disabilities. Even fewer cases feature people 
with life-long cognitive disabilities; the plaintiffs in most reported decisions 
have temporary cognitive losses (e.g. from chemotherapy)96 or have returned to 
work after accidents causing neurological damage.9 Data from 1992-97
2 2 0 , 112 S ta t . 9 3 6  (1 9 9 8 ) . In th e o ry , th e  a m e n d m e n ts  g o  fu r th e r  th a n  th e  A D A  a n d  th a n  th e  o r ig in a l 
R e h a b ili ta t io n  A ct. (F o r  a  c o m p a r is o n  o f  th e  R e h a b ili ta t io n  A ct o f  1973  a n d  A D A  T itle  I, a rg u in g  
th a t th e  p r in c ip a l d if fe re n c e  is  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  T itle  I to  p r iv a te  e m p lo y e rs , s e e  K a th leen  D . H en ry , 
C i v i l  R i g h t s  a n d  t h e  D i s a b l e d :  A  C o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  A c t  o f  1 9 7 3  a n d  t h e  A m e r i c a n s  
w i t h  D i s a b i l i t i e s  A c t  i n  t h e  E m p l o y m e n t  S e t t i n g ,  5 4  ALB. L. R e v . 123 (1 9 9 0 )) . 1 say  in  th e o ry  
b e c a u se  th e re  a re  ve ry  rea l q u e s tio n s  a b o u t f u n d in g  lev e ls  a n d  se rv ic e  p ro v is io n  u n d e r  th e  
W o rk fo rc e  A ct. S e e  K reg e l, s u p r a  n o te  2 0 , a t 9 6  (A le x a n d e r  J. T y m c h u k  e t a l. ed s ., 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e  
W o rk fo rc e  In v e s tm e n t A c t a m e n d m e n ts  re q u ire  v o c a tio n a l tra in in g  fo r a ll q u a l if ie d  p e rso n s  w ith  
d is a b i li t ie s . S e e  D re w  & H a rd m a n , s u p r a  n o te  5 , a t 2 5 5 . In e n a c tin g  th e se  a m e n d m e n ts . C o n g re s s  
m a d e  f in d in g s  th a t h a v in g  a  d is a b i li ty  d o e s  n o t d im in is h  th e  r ig h t o f  a  p e rso n  to  live  in d e p e n d e n tly , 
e n jo y  s e lf -d e te rm in a tio n , m a k e  c h o ic e s , c o n tr ib u te  to  so c ie ty , p u rs u e  a  m e a n in g fu l c a re e r , a n d  
“e n jo y  fu ll in c lu s io n  a n d  in te g ra t io n  in  th e  e c o n o m ic , p o litic a l, s o c ia l, c u l tu ra l ,  a n d  e d u c a tio n a l 
m a in s tre a m  o f  A m e ric a n  s o c ie ty ."  2 9  U .S .C . § 701 (a )(3 )(  A )-(F ) (2 0 0 4 ) . T o  th is  e n d . th e  W o rk fo rc e  
In v e s tm e n t A ct s e e k s  to  h a v e  th e  fed era l g o v e rn m e n t p la y  a  le a d e rs h ip  ro le  in p ro m o tin g  the  
e m p lo y m e n t o f  p e o p le  w ith  d is a b i li t ie s  a n d  to  a s s is t s ta te  g o v e rn m e n ts  " in  fu lf i llin g  th e  a s p ira tio n s  
o f  su c h  in d iv id u a ls  w ith  d is a b i li t ie s  fo r  m e a n in g fu l a n d  g a in fu l e m p lo y m e n t a n d  in d e p e n d e n t 
liv in g .”  2 9  U .S .C . § 7 0 1 (b ) (2 )  (2 0 0 4 ) . T h e  A c t’s s ta te m e n t o f  p o lic y  e m p h a s iz e s  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
m e a n in g fu l w ork : “ w o rk  . . .is  a  v a lu e d  a c tiv i ty , b o th  fo r  in d iv id u a ls  a n d  s o c ie ty ; a n d  fu lf i lls  th e  
n ee d  o f  an  in d iv id u a l to  b e  p ro d u c tiv e , p ro m o te s  in d e p e n d e n c e , e n h a n c e s  se lf -e s te e m , a n d  a llo w s  
fo r  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  th e  m a in s tre a m  o f  life  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s .”  2 9  U .S .C . § 7  (2 0 0 4 ) . O th e r  
a d v a n c e d  in d u s tr ia liz e d  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  e x p lo re d  s im i la r  e f fo r ts  to  b r in g  p e o p le  w ith  d is a b i li t ie s  in to  
th e  w o rk fo rce . F o r  a  c o m p a r is o n  o f  th e  A D A  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t p o lic y  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  
im p o r ta n t su g g e s tio n s  fo r  fu r th e r  re se a rc h , s e e  B la n c k  &  S c h a rtz . s u p r a  n o te  56 .
9 4 . W e b e r , D i s a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  L a w  o f  W e l f a r e ,  s u p r a  n o te  76 , a t 9 4 1 .
9 5 . I d .
9 6 . E . g . ,  W h itn e y  v. G re e n b e rg , R o s e n b la tt ,  K u ll &  B itso li, 2 5 8  F .3 d  3 0  (1 s t C ir . 2 0 0 1 ).
9 7 . E . g „  M o y s is  v. D T G  D a ta n e t, 2 7 8  F .3 d  8 19  (8 th  C ir . 2 0 0 2 ) .
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indicate that less than 1 % o f the Title I complaints tc the EEOC were brought 
by persons with cognitive disabilities.98 Perhaps this paucity of litigation 
indicates that people with mental retardation are much less likely to attempt to 
enter the work force at all; the fact that most of the employment discrimination 
complaints did not involve discrimination in hiring decisions— the point of 
entry into the workforce— is indirect support for this contention.99 The recently 
decided cases discussed below illustrate typical ways in which the employment 
potential of people with lifelong intellectual disabilities is underestimated in 
current law and in the current structure of employment. As such, these cases 
suggest further ways of developing the civil rights paradigm with respect to 
people with cognitive disabilities.
1. Self-accommodation
The first vertex of the problematic triangle for people with disabilities 
alleging employment discrimination is self-accommodation— success despite a 
disability. People with intellectual disabilities at this vertex have been subjected 
to the Supreme Court’s recent narrow reading of the definition of disability.100 
E m ory  v. A straZ eneca P harm aceu tica ls101 illustrates the problems posed by 
self-accommodation for people with cognitive disabilities. Emory contended 
that cerebral palsy and learning disabilities substantially limited him in the 
major life activities of completing manual tasks and learning.102 He had been 
employed as a Maintenance Custodian at AstraZeneca for 26 years; during that 
time, he had also worked as a Detail Foreman, a job with some management 
responsibilities.103 His performance evaluations had always been positive.104 
When AstraZeneca posted a new position, Second Shift Services Coordinator, 
Emory applied for it but was not selected.105 He claimed the failure to promote 
him was discrimination on the basis o f his disability.106
AstraZeneca moved for summary judgment on the theory that Emory had 
not shown that he was substantially limited in a major life activity and thus did
9 8 . K re g e l, s u p r a  n o te  2 0 , a t  89.
9 9 . I d .
100. E . g . ,  S u tto n  v. U n ite d  A ir lin e s , 5 2 7  U .S . 471  (1 9 9 9 ) .
101. E m o ry  v . A s tra Z e n e c a  P h a rm a c e u tic a ls , 2 0 0 3  U .S . D is t .  L E X IS  2 2 4 3 0  (D . D e l. 2 0 0 3 ) .
102. I d .  a t  *3 -4 .
103. I d .  a t  *2.
104. I d .
105. I d .  *
106. I d .  a t  *3 .
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not qualify as disabled under the ADA.107 Emory alleged that, because of his 
cerebral palsy, he was substantially limited in the major life activities of| f\Q
completing manual tasks and learning. There was no dispute that cerebral 
palsy was a qualifying impairment.10 There was also no dispute that learning 
and completing manual tasks are major life activities for purposes of the 
definition of disability under the ADA.110 The dispute was instead over whether 
Emory was substantially limited in these activities.111 On this score, his success 
was his undoing; the court granted AstraZeneca’s motion for summary 
judgment.112 The court’s reasoning illustrates the consequences of self­
accommodation for people with cognitive disabilities.
The court’s analysis of whether Emory was limited in the major life
activity of learning illustrated the problem posed by self-accommodation. The
standard applied by the court was “how the individual’s difficulty to learn
compares with the average person’s difficulty and whether this disparity means
the individual is significantly restricted.”1 Emory had graduated from high
school, albeit in special education courses, and had continued to upgrade his
computer skills through occupational training.114 He had passed the
certification requirements to become a fireman and a family mediator.115 The
court concluded that, given this success, he “cannot establish that his learning
difficulties amount to a disability under the ADA.”116 This conclusory
discussion was entirely outcome-oriented. The court never considered whether
Emory had encountered much more significant difficulties than would have
been usual in achieving what he did. It ignored such comparative inquiry
altogether and looked only at Emory’s achievements. The court’s discussion of
the major life activity of performing manual tasks was similarly flawed. The
court noted that Emory had “some limitations” and “need[ed] assistance” in his
ability to do household chores, but concluded that “[these] limitations [were]
not substantial or severe” because of the important tasks Emory could
117perform. Emory drove, was married and had raised children, operated a
107. E m o r y ,  2 0 0 3  U .S . D is t. 2 2 4 3 0 0  a t  *4 .
108. I d .  a t * 3 -4 .
109. I d .  a t *8 .
110. I d .  a t *9.
111. I d .  a t * 10 .
112. I d .  a t *14 .
113. E m o r y ,  2 0 0 3  U .S . D is t. 2 2 4 3 0 0  a t  *12 .
114. I d .
115. I d .
116. I d .  a t * 1 2 -1 3 .
117. I d .  a t *11 .
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118cleaning business on the side, and served his community as a firefighter. 
These successes were sufficient to preclude Emory from being substantially 
limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks and thereby 
claiming the protection of the ADA.119 Here again, the court ignored whether 
Emory had encountered greater than average difficulties in attaining these 
achievements. Such outcome-based analyses are problematic for all cases of 
disability, but they are particularly problematic for cases of intellectual 
impairments. Reaching the outcomes Emory achieved should not be equated 
with being “average.” Outcome measures may both underestimate the extent of 
Emory’s achievements and overestimate the extent to which his capacities differ 
from the average. They mistakenly assume that because of his 
accomplishments— which were undeniably impressive— he cannot be 
cognitively disabled.
2. Support on the Job
A second recent ruling illustrates the difficulties for people with 
intellectual disabilities when work is understood in highly individualistic terms. 
“Job coaching” is a strategy utilized to help people with intellectual 
impairments with learning and performing jobs.12 The regulations governing 
Title I of the ADA recognize that temporary job coaching may be determined to 
be a reasonable accommodation on a case-by-case basis.121 In general, 
however, the regulations stipulate that job coaching is not a reasonable 
accommodation for which the employer is required to pay.122 The regulations 
do not consider the possibility that sources other than the employer (parents, 
social service agencies, private charities) might underwrite the expenses of the 
coach, although this is a common practice. In a recent district court ruling, a suit 
by an employee, who was fired because of the presence of a job coach, survived 
a motion for summary judgment.123 Limits imposed in the court’s ruling, 
however, illustrate how mistaken assumptions about employment may be
118. I d .
119. E m o r y ,  2 0 0 3  U .S . D is t. 2 2 4 3 0 0  a t  * 11 .
120. D r e w  &  H a r d m a n ,  s u p r a  n o te  S, a t  3 0 6 .
121. 2 9  C .F .R . a p p . § 1 6 3 0 .9  (2 0 0 4 ) . A d d itio n a lly , th e  E E O C  h a s  is s u e d  a n  E n fo rc e m e n t 
G u id a n c e  o n  th e  A D A  a n d  P sy c h ia tr ic  D is a b il i t ie s  ( a m e n d e d  in  1997  to  ta k e  S u t t o n  in to  a c c o u n t)  
a v a i l a b l e  a t  h t tp : / /w w w .e e o c .g o v /p o lic y /d o c s /p s y c h .h tm l ( la s t v is ite d  A u g . 1, 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e re  is  n o  
s p e c ia l g u id a n c e  re g a rd in g  m e n ta l re ta rd a tio n . T h e  s p e c ia l  g u id a n c e  o n  p s y c h ia tr ic  d is a b i li t ie s  
s p e c if ic a l ly  sa y s  th a t an  e m p lo y e r-p ro v id e d  te m p o ra ry  jo b  c o a c h  m ig h t b e  re q u ire d  as a  re a s o n a b le  
a c c o m m o d a tio n  o n  a  c a se -b y -c a s e  b a s is , i f  it  is  n o t  a n  u n d u e  h a rd s h ip . I d .  A n  a c c o m m o d a tio n  m a y  
a ls o  in c lu d e  a  lo n g e r- te rm  c o a c h  i f  th e  c o a c h  is  p a id  fo r  b y  a  s o c ia l s e rv ic e  a g e n c y , a g a in  b a r r in g  
u n d u e  h a rd s h ip . I d .
122 . 2 9  C .F .R . a p p . § 1 6 3 0 .9  (2 0 0 4 ) .
123 . E E O C  v . D o lla r  G en . C o rp .,  2 5 2  F . S u p p . 2 d  1 1 1  (M .D .N .C . 2 0 0 3 ) .
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applied to employees who are dependent on job coaching for employment 
success.
Bobbie Bost, the employee in the case, was a 45-year-old woman with 
moderate mental retardation.124 She lived in a group home with 24-hour 
supervision125 and worked with a job coach, Robin Onuoha.126 One of 
Onuoha’s functions as Bost’s coach was to help her in finding employment;
with Onuoha’s assistance, Bost applied for and received a position as a clerk at
1 01a Dollar General store. Onuoha explained to the manager that she would be 
with Bost to help her with understanding and remembering instructions, with 
arranging her workplace to make it more manageable for her to perform tasks, 
and with performing tasks she could not do independently.128 Dollar General 
did not bear any of the costs of Onuoha’s coaching.129 Bost’s duties included 
cleaning bathrooms and other areas of the store, folding merchandise and 
putting it away, picking up trash, and carrying boxes to the trash.130 Bost 
performed all these tasks properly, with the assistance of the coach.131 Bost 
could not, however, operate a cash register or unload boxes from delivery
trucks; during her four months of employment with Dollar General, she was not
132asked to do any of these tasks.
133When Bost was hired, the assistant store manager was Kenyatta Smith. 
Before hiring Bost, Smith sought the approval of the district manager, Ricky 
McCray.134 Shortly thereafter, Kathryn Von Cannon became manager of the 
store; it was her understanding that she could not fire employees without 
McCray’s approval.135 When McCray visited the store where Bost worked and 
saw Bost, he allegedly said “are we paying for that?” and “well, get rid of it.”136 
Von Cannon then fired Bost.137 The expressed reason for the discharge was
124. I d .  a t  2 8 0 .
125. I d .  a t  2 8 4 .
126. I d .  a t  2 8 0 .
127. I d .
128. I d .
129. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F . S u p p . 2 d  a t  2 8 0 .
130. I d .  a t 2 8 0 -8 1 .
131. I d .  a t  2 8 1 .
132. I d .  a t  2 8 0 .
133. I d .
134. I d .
135. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F . S u p p . 2 d  a t 2 8 1 .
136. I d .
137. I d .
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“lack of work” and “payroll,” but Dollar General continued to hire new 
clerks.138
The reported decision ruled on cross motions for summary judgment.139 
Dollar General based its motion for summary judgment on the assertion that 
Bost could not perform the essential functions of the clerk position and was 
therefore not a qualified individual with a disability.140 Dollar’s argument relied 
on the job coach and on Bost’s inability to perform tasks such as operating the 
cash register that. Dollar contended, were essential functions for a clerk.141 
Bost’s motion contended that she had established a prima facie case of 
discrimination and Dollar had not brought forth any non-pretextual reason for 
the termination.142 The court concluded that there were genuine issues of 
material fact about Bost’s qualifications and about Dollar’s reasons for 
terminating her, and denied both motions.143
It was undisputed that Bost had a disability, mental retardation.144 
Although Dollar raised questions about the evidence, the court also concluded 
that Bost was substantially limited in the major life activities of thinking, 
learning, self-care, and communication.145 With respect to the qualifications 
required for the clerk position, the court concluded as a matter of law that 
Dollar had established a modified position that did not require her to perform all 
the functions of a clerk.146 Although Dollar had a store manual that listed only 
three positions— manager, assistant manager, and clerk—Dollar’s practice was 
not to insist that all clerks perform every function of the position. Moreover, 
there was no evidence that Bost had failed to perform satisfactorily in the tasks 
she was assigned; indeed, she typically would ask for more work when she had 
completed her assigned tasks.1
The difficult issue in the case was whether the job coach was a reasonable 
accommodation. Dollar’s position was that while a temporary coach might be 
reasonable depending on the circumstances, the indefinite need for a coach
138. I d .
139. I d .  a t 2 93 .
140. I d .  a t 2 8 1 -8 2 .
141. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F. S u p p . 2 d  a t  2 85 .
142. I d .  a t 2 8 2 .
143. I d .  a t 2 9 3 .
144. I d .  a t 2 8 4 .
145. I d .
146. I d .  a t  2 86 .
147. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F. S u p p . 2 d  a t  2 8 6 .
148. I d .  a t  2 8 7 .
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could not be.149 In Dollar’s view, an individual could not be qualified if she 
required ongoing assistance; the need for such assistance would show that she 
could not perform the job.150 Nor could the individual be qualified if the job 
coach performed some of her tasks; that would show she could not do what she 
had been hired to do.151 Bost argued to the contrary that the ongoing need for a 
reader for a blind employee, or a signer for a deaf employee, does not defeat the 
claim of qualifications.152 A job coach’s help with instructions should be 
viewed in similar fashion.153 The court concluded that if the job coach were 
permanent, it would show Bost could not perform the job.154 The court reached 
this conclusion despite the fact that the employer was not expected to pay for 
the coach;155 there was also no indication in the case that the coach interrupted 
the normal flow of business in the store. The court also concluded that if the 
coach were performing some of Bost’s assigned tasks that fact would suffice to 
show that Bost was not qualified.156 It concluded that there were material issues 
of fact on both counts. In ruling as it did about job coaching, the court 
referred to two earlier, unreported decisions, concluding that use of a coach on a 
permanent basis would show the employee was unqualified, even if the 
employer were not required to pay for the coach.158 In one of these cases, the 
court had ruled that an employee with Down syndrome whose mother came 
along to help him do his job was not qualified within the meaning of the 
ADA.159
Thus, to summarize, as the D o lla r  G eneral court read the ADA, employee 
qualifications are to be measured in their unsupported state. Job coaching must 
be temporary and must not supplant the employee’s individual performance. 
Permanent job coaching cannot be a reasonable accommodation as a matter of 
law, even if the employer bears no costs and incurs no inconvenience. Such 
isolationist demands are not made of either physically disabled employees (who 
may need readers, signers, and so on) or even non-disabled employees, who 
may have to work together to accomplish their tasks.
149. I d .  a t  2 90 .
150. I d .
151. I d .
152. I d .
153. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 2 9 0 .
154. I d .  a t 2 9 3 .
155. I d .  a t 2 80 .
156. I d .  a t 2 9 3 .
157. I d .
158. I d .  a t 2 9 1 .
159. D o l l a r  G e n .  C o r p . ,  2 5 2  F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 2 9 1 .
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3. Teamwork
In addition to supported employment, employment teams are another 
strategy to enhance the employment potential of people with intellectual 
disabilities.*60 Teamwork can be especially helpful in encouraging socially 
appropriate behavior.161 Nonetheless, courts have rejected the requirement that 
jobs be structured into teams as reasonable accommodations under the ADA. In 
W alsted ,162 for example, the employee was fired for on-the-job misbehavior; 
she contended that, because of her disability, she did not understand that what 
she was doing was wrong.163 The employer contested Walsted’s claims that she 
was disabled under the terms of the ADA, that she was otherwise qualified, and 
that a reasonable accommodation was available.164 In denying Woodbury 
County’s motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that Walsted had 
raised issues of material fact on each contention.165 Like other courts, however, 
the W alsted  court limited its ruling in ways that may diminish recognition of the 
capacities of people with intellectual disabilities.
The initial issue on which the court ruled was Walsted’s claim to be 
disabled.166 The undisputed facts were that Walsted was fifty-tyree years old, 
with a kindergarten education.167 Her IQ score was 73; she had a kindergarten 
reading level, a first grade spelling ability, and a second grade arithmetic 
ability.168 She alleged, although without support in the record, that she suffered 
from dyslexia.169 Walsted argued that she was disabled because, as a result of 
her impairments, she was substantially limited in the major life activities of 
learning and reading.170 To assess whether a limit is substantial, the court 
considers its nature and severity, its duration, and its long-term impact.171 The 
court concluded that Walsted’s assessment scores raised a genuine issue of 
material fact “that she is significantly restricted, as compared to an average 
person in the general population, as to the duration, manner, and condition
320 The Jo u rn a l o f  G ender, R a ce  & Ju stice  [8:2004]
160. D r e w  &  H a r d m a n  s u p r a  n o te  5 , a t  3 0 6 .
161. I d .  a t  3 0 7 .
162. W a ls te d  v. W o o d b u ry  C o u n ty , 113 F . S u p p . 2 d  131 8  (N .D . Io w a  2 0 0 0 ).
163. I d .  a t  133 3 -3 4 .
164. I d .  a t  1321 .
165. I d .  a t  1343 .
166. I d .  a t  1 3 2 7 -3 1 .
167. I d .  a t  1322.
168. W a l s t e d ,  113 F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 1322 .
169. I d .  a t l 3 2 2 n . l .
170. I d .  a t  1329 .
171. I d .  a t  1327.
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under which she can conduct the ‘major life activities’ of learning and 
reading.”172 The court also determined that Walsted had raised the issue of 
whether she was substantially limited in the major life activities of thinking and 
concentrating.173 Because she had not introduced relevant evidence, the court 
rejected her contention that she was substantially limited in the major life 
activity of interacting with others.174 The court did not reach the question of 
whether she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working.175 
This last question, the court said, should be reached only if she were 
unsuccessful in alleging limits in other major life activities.176
The second issue on which the court ruled was Walsted’s claim that she
was otherwise qualified for her employment.177 Walsted had begun work as a
custodial employee for Woodbury County in 1989.178 Her responsibilities
included general office cleaning and maintaining restroom supplies.179 She
performed these duties without incident until 1995, when a new building
i fin
superintendent was appointed. The new superintendent, Elgert, had no 
experience in working with employees with disabilities.181 Shortly thereafter, 
Walsted was charged with the theft of a fellow employee’s wallet.182 Her story 
was that she had decided to play a “trick” on her co-worker by hiding her 
wallet.183 Indeed, she did not take the wallet away from the workplace or take 
anything out of it.184 As a result of this incident, Walsted was suspended 
without pay and referred to the employee assistance program.1 5 Her 
superintendent gave her a memo about job expectations and explained it to her 
and she returned to work.186 Before 1995, most of Walsted’s work had been
172. I d .  a t 1329 .
173. I d .  a t 1330 .
174. W a l s t e d .  113 F. S u p p . 2 d  at 1330 .
175. I d .
176. I d .  a t 1 3 3 0 -3 1 .
177. I d .  a t 1 3 3 1 -3 3 .
178. I d .  a t 1322 .
179. I d .
180. W a l s t e d ,  113 F. S u p p . 2 d  a t 1322 .
181. I d .
182. I d .
183. I d .
184. I d .  a t 1323 .
185. I d .
186. W a l s t e d ,  113  F. S u p p . 2 d  a t  1323.
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with other custodians.187 After the appointment of the new superintendent, she
was assigned a new route, the Courthouse basement area, which included the
Department of Motor Vehicles.188 The assignment left her with mostly solitary
work.189 She was riven no orientation to the area and no training about items to
be found there.1 In 1997, she was arrested for the theft o f automobile
validation stickers.191 Her explanation was that when she got bored, she
practiced wrapping boxes she had retrieved from the trash.192 She found the
stickers on the desk and used them to decorate the boxes.193 After this incident, 
1Q4she was fired.
Woodbury County contended that these incidents demonstrated that 
Walsted was not qualified for the job of custodian.195 One of the essential 
duties of her job was her responsibility for seeing that papers, documents and 
belongings remained undisturbed as she cleaned.196 Her two convictions for 
theft demonstrated that she could not meet this requirement, according to the 
County.197 Walsted contended, on the other hand, that she had performed the 
job satisfactorily for eight years.198 With better supervision, she argued, she 
would have understood the importance of documents and items.199 Had she 
been assigned a different work area, with other custodial workers, she would 
not have had those difficulties.200 The County argued that they had provided 
her with sufficient training, and the additional supervision she requested was 
not a reasonable accommodation.201 The court concluded that because of her 
generally satisfactory work experience of over eight years, Walsted had raised a 
material issue of fact about whether she met necessary job prerequisites.202 The
187. I d .  a t  1322 .
188. I d .  a t  1323 .
189. I d .
190. I d .
191. I d .
192. W a l s t e d ,  113 F . S u p p . 2 d  a t 1323 .
193. I d .
194. I d .
195. I d .  a t  1331 .
196. I d .
197. I d .
198. W a l s t e d ,  113 F. S u p p . 2 d  a t  1332 .
199. I d .
200 . I d .
2 01 . I d .  a t  1 3 3 3 -3 4 .
2 02 . I d .  a t  1332 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
E m ploym en t a n d  In te llec tu a l D isab ility 323
court also concluded that there was a material issue about whether the County
203had provided sufficient accommodation in the form of job training. Although
the County had attempted to educate Walsted after the first theft incident, there
was no evidence in the record that the referral to the Employee Assistance
• • • * 2 0 4Program provided her with meaningful help, given her cognitive disabilities. 
The court concluded that Walsted had raised a material issue about whether the 
County could have provided her with further and more appropriate training as 
an accommodation.2 5
At the same time, however, the court made clear that it would reject 
several other accommodations that might be requested on Walsted’s behalf. The 
County was not required to eliminate essential job functions, assign someone to 
watch her, or hire additional staff.206 Nor was it required to reassign existing 
workers to assist her in her duties or to transfer her to another location. Of 
these, transfer was the only accommodation actually requested by Walsted; the 
court raised the other suggestions on its own.208 In raising and dismissing these 
suggestions, the court raised the threat of expensive alterations in job 
circumstances as special accommodations to Walsted. The court did not 
consider whether in the circumstances of this case, given the decision to shift 
away from an apparently successful prior teamwork structure, any of these 
might have been reasonable accommodations. The court simply took for granted 
the job structure the County had put into place. Walsted had also raised the 
issue of whether Woodbury County had appropriately engaged in an interactive 
process of identifying accommodations with her.209 Finally, Woodbury County 
claimed that they had discharged Walsted for a non-discriminatory reason: 
theft.210 The County’s view was that they could hold Walsted to the same 
disciplinary standard that they would hold any other employee.211 Walsted 
contended that her misconduct was causally related to her disability and neither 
presented a direct threat nor came within the ADA’s provisions about alcohol or 
drug abuse.212 The court rejected the idea that the County could simply hold 
Walsted to exactly the same standard of conduct as a nondisabled employee,
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concluding that Walsted’s misconduct should have been considered under the 
standards for an accommodative process.213
The W alsted  court thus both opened and closed opportunities for 
accommodation for Walsted. It opened the possibility of re-examining the 
training she had received and of further training aimed at enabling her to 
succeed as a solitary worker. But it closed the possibility of re-examining the 
individualized job assignments.
III. Conclusion
If the ADA is read narrowly, as it has been by contemporary courts, it does 
not protect people with intellectual disabilities in many contexts. One way to 
interpret this protective gap is that it responds to the productive incapacities of 
people with cognitive disabilities. Another way of interpreting the gap, 
however, is that it exists at least in part because of problematic assumptions 
about both cognitive disabilities and the nature of work. E m ory  illustrates how 
courts may misconstrue outcomes for capacities. D o lla r  G enera l and W alsted  
assume that performance must be individual. Individuals who work with 
coaches or in teams are deemed unqualified because of their need for 
cooperation— or so these courts assumed in concluding that coaching or team 
assignments could not be reasonable accommodations. Without such 
assumptions, the issue instead would have been whether such restructuring of 
work was an undue hardship, by virtue of its expense, inconvenience, or other 
difficulties.
These individualistic assumptions about work are particularly damaging 
for people with cognitive disabilities. They deprive people with cognitive 
disabilities of workplace accommodations that are especially likely to foster 
success on the job for them. But we do not, in other areas of life, regard people 
as deficient because they do better with coordination or cooperation. Ride 
sharing is an encouraged method for reducing the personal and social costs of 
driving to work individually. The economics literature recognizes employment 
teams as potentially efficient.214 Imposing individualistic assumptions on 
people with intellectual disabilities may create significant barriers to their 
participation in the workplace and, as a result o f their clustering at the third 
vertex of inability to self-accommodate or compete successfully with 
accommodations, consign them to the lot of the apparently unqualified. 
Continued questioning of these assumptions about individual capacities and the 
nature of work may help us to recognize that we have been too quick to 
conclude that people with cognitive disabilities cannot perform jobs
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satisfactorily without “special” support. These assumptions are discriminatory; 
re-examining them is demanded by civil rights, not welfare.
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